

VI.

HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL NOTES.


CRITICS AND APOLOGISTS.

In the Expository Times for February, 1896, p. 227, an editorial notice of Dr. W. H. Green's treatise on The Higher Criticism of the Pentateuch began in these words: "There is now but one Old Testament scholar who rejects the results of criticism." So said a higher critic recently; and he named the scholar—Prof. Green, of Princeton. The statement was too severe on some other men, but not too complimentary to Prof. Green. For he is a scholar; they who resent his attitude most hotly admit it most readily."

Exactly three years have elapsed since the above statement appeared. What is now the "advanced thought" of the higher critics in respect to Prof. Green, as reported in the Expository Times for February, 1899? They have discovered in the interval that he is not a scholar. Criticism that is up to date is now able to treat him with contempt. Thus they who venture still to believe in the historic truth of the Old Testament are left poor indeed. Their only scholar has been discredited! We should be sorry to think that the accomplished editor of the theological magazine in which Dr. Green has been held up to derision has changed the opinion which he formerly expressed regarding the learning of that honored Christian apologist. Possibly owing to the pressure of work now devolving upon him the obnoxious paragraphs escaped his observation.

The Rev. J. A. Selbie has charge of the department entitled, "Among the Periodicals," in the Expository Times. In the issue referred to he reproduces with unmistakable approbation some criticisms which Dr. Carl Steuernagel wrote in the Theologische Rundschau of last December in condemnation of apologetic treatises recently translated into German. Mr. Selbie will be naturally considered a high authority on Biblical literature from his editorial position, and from the fact that he is the chief assistant of Dr. Hastings in the preparation of the new Dictionary of the Bible now in course of publication by Messrs. Clark, of Edinburgh, Dr. Steuernagel is privat-dozent of Theology in Halle, and is author of a Commentary on Deuteronomy which appeared last year in the Nowack series of manuals. Grave and damaging accusations made by such men, it seems to us, ought not to be left unnoticed, especially in view of the tone of assurance with which they are brought forward, which is fitted to impose on the inconsiderate and ignorant.





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Against Dr. Green in particular, and recent apologists in general, Dr. Steuernagel, as reported in the Expository Times, brings these three serious charges: "That their work is frequently of a very superficial character, that they set up a man of straw for their attacks, and that even their Biblical knowledge often leaves much to be desired." From reading Dr. Steuernagel's original article we can testify that he is not misrepresented. We must now confine our attention to an examination of the truth of these charges as preferred against Dr. Green, who is the chief mark of our critics. The second of these charges we take up first, as it is evidently considered the most crushing, and its statement in the English translation is followed by a note of exclamation: "Green sets up a man of straw to represent the position of critics when he alleges that the latter, whenever the name Jahueh occurs in an 'Elohistic' passage, assume that a redactor has either introduced a sentence from a parallel narrative or altered the original Elohim into Jahweh. Green actually makes this allegation in connection with passages subsequent to Ex. iii, although every critic knows that E tells us in Ex. iii. 13ff. of the revelation of the new divine name Jahweh to Moses, and that from this point onwards the latter name even preponderates in E!"

It is in review of Dr. Green's Higher Criticism of the Pentateuch that this accusation is made. The offense charged, if proved to have been actually committed, must be pronounced utterly inexcusable, and would of itself be sufficient to destroy Dr. Green's reputation as a scholar. But what must be said of his accusers if they have borne false witness against him? His is not the only reputation at stake.

Has Dr. Green "set up a man of straw [a Zerrbild as the original has it] to represent the position of critics?" We will let the most distinguished of the higher critics represent, in their own words, their position in regard to the mooted point. They should know what they have been in the habit of teaching. Dr. August Dillmann, professor of Theology in Berlin, who died in 1894, gives the testimony of an expert in his treatise Ueber die Composition des Hexateuch, appended to the second edition of his Commentary on Numbers, Deuteronomy and Joshua. On p. 617, in treating of the Elohistic document, whose existence he and the other divisive critics postulate, Dillmann thus writes: "Das wichtigste Kennzeichen dieser Schrift ist die Benennung Gottes mit Elohim (auch nach der Einsetzung des Jahvenamens Ex. iii), welche E mit andern alten Geschichtsschreibern (in Jud. u. Sam., vgl. Knobel, 561) gemeinsam hat; sie ist bei ihm durchgängig, u. "Till" in seinen Stücken erst durch die späteren Bearbeiter hereingebracht."

In this quotation Dillmann distinctly asserts that the most important criterion of the E document is its naming of the Deity by Elohim, and that God is so named in it both before and after Ex. iii; that this use of Elohim in E is thoroughgoing, or universal; and that when the name Jehovah is found in passages belonging to E, its introduction is to be ascribed to later hands. If Dillmann was competent to give a correct

account of his own doctrine, Dr. Green must be acquitted of the charge of setting up a man of straw, ein Zerrbild, to represent the position of the higher critics.

Prof. Julius Wellhausen is another witness who may be allowed to give testimony on this question. In his treatise, Die Composition des Hexateuchs und der historischen Bücher des alten Testaments, p. 72, speaking of Ex. iii. 10–15, which he claims for the Elohistie document, he remarks: "Wirklich erscheint hier überall im Munde des Erzählers v. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, während von nun ab dies Kriterium für längere Zeit aufhört, freilich wie es scheint, mehr durch Schuld des Bearbeiters, als nach der Absieht des Elohisten selber, der nach wie vor für gewöhnlich den allgemeinen Namen gebraucht zu haben scheint."

In this quotation Wellhausen clearly makes the use of the name Elohim a criterion of the E document, and ascribes the omission of this name in Elohistic passages after Ex. iii to the fault of the redactor, and not to the original author, whom Wellhausen holds to have, both before and after Ex. iii, commonly employed the general name of God or Elohim. To produce further evidence at our command on this head would be a work of supererogation.

Dr. Green does not pretend to be infallible, but reviewers should be very careful of rashly accusing him of disgraceful blundering, lest haply they fling a boomerang which may recoil to their own hurt. Dr. Green knows as well as any living man the tricks of the redactor whom the critics are obliged to assume for the purpose of upholding the modern documentary hypothesis of the composition of the Pentateuch. He could truly say of him what Paul says of Satan: "We are not ignorant of his devices." He is not likely to be caught napping while describing his varied and whimsical operations. He has studied the work assigned to R thoroughly, and has given the best description of it that we have anywhere seen. It seems very superstitious on the part of the critics to profess to believe in such a being in this enlightened age. But they feel that they cannot get along without him, and so to them R is a name to conjure with. Here is Dr. Green's account of that strange character whose symbol is R: "The most capricious and inconsistent conduct is attributed to R, such as is an impeachment of both his honesty and good sense. He is held responsible, in fact, for everything that is at variance with the requirements of the hypothesis. And on the supposition that such a person really existed and did the work ascribed to him, it is quite impossible to form any intelligent notion of his methods or his aims. We are told that in some places he carefully preserves minute fragments of his sources, though they are a superfluous repetition of what has already been more fully stated in the language of other documents; and vet elsewhere he freely omits large and essential portions of them. In some places he preserves unchanged what is represented to be plainly antagonistic, while in other places he is careful to smooth away discrepancies and to give a different turn to variant passages by transpositions or

by insertions of his own. He sometimes keeps his documents quite distinct in language and form, at other times he effaces their peculiarities or blends them inextricably together. All these offices must be assumed in order to carry the hypothesis safely through; but whether such a bundle of contradictions was ever inearnate in any actually existing person, the only proof of his existence being that these contradictory things are alleged about him, every one must judge for himself' (Hebraica, Vol. vii, p. 35f.). This is no caricature of R. Those familiar with Pentateuchal criticism will without difficulty recognize the accuracy of the portraiture in every feature.

In the quotation made from the *Expository Times* it is affirmed that "every critic knows that E tells us in Ex. iii. 13ff. of the revelation of the new divine name *Jahweh* to Moses" This is what no critic *knows*. But the destructive critics *profess* to know it. Herein they greatly err.

To obviate misapprehension it is proper to observe that Dr. Green does not assert that the critics always assume that the presence of the name Elohim in what they call a J section is owing to the interference of R. On the contrary, he says expressly in his Higher Criticism, p. 91, that "Elohim is repeatedly found along with Jehovah in passages attributed to J where the critics explain that the author of this document used both names as the occasion demanded." He appropriately asks, "If J could use both of these names, and in so doing was governed by their inherent signification and by the appropriateness of each to the connection in which they are severally employed, why might not P and E do the same? Or why, in fact, is there any need for J, P or E, or for any other than the one author to whom a uniform tradition attributes all that it has been proposed to parcel among these unknown and undiscoverable personages?"

We now turn to the first of the charges made by Steuernagel. It is thus stated: "It is surely a very superficial explanation of the interchange of the divine names to say with Green that Jahweh is employed when God is thought of as the God of salvation and of gracious condescension, whereas the name Elohim is chosen when he appears as the Creator or Judge of the world. Why, then," asks Steuernagel, "is the God who enters into covenant with Noah (Gen. ix) and with Abraham (Gen. xvii) called Elohim? Why is the God who executes judgment on Sodom and Gomorrah called Jahweh? Why is it that in perfectly parallel narratives we find at one time Jahweh and at another time Elohim? (compare Gen. xii. 10-20 with xx. 1-17)."

We agree with Steuernagel that if Dr. Green had given such an inadequate account of the divine names as he attributes to him, it would furnish a very superficial and unsatisfactory explanation of their interchange. But what if Steuernagel is here guilty of the offense which he charges on Dr. Green, which we have already weighed and found wanting? What if he sets up a man of straw instead of the real Dr. Green? This is what he has done. He does not fairly represent the position of

the man whom he antagonizes. Dr. Green, in his discussion so courageously and triumphantly carried on in Hebraica with Prof. W. R. Harper, could not have proceeded far in the attempt to show the appropriate and discriminating use in Genesis of Jehovah and Elohim respectively without seeing the futility of his contention if he had only followed the simple rule attributed to him as sufficient for explaining everywhere the preferential employment of one or other of the two divine names Jehovah and Elohim. We have not been able to discover that Dr. Green has stated in any of his writings that Jehovah cannot be properly used when God is thought of as Judge of the world. He knew that Jehovah-Elohim pronounced sentence on the old serpent and on our first parents, and that Jehovah judged Cain; and he often refers to acts of judgment on the world performed by Jehovah. In the book which Dr. Steuernagel reviews, Dr. Green carefully distinguishes the two divine names as follows:*

"Elohim is the general name for God, and is applied both to the true God and to pagan deities. Jehovah is not a common but a proper noun. It belongs to the true God alone, and is His characteristic name, by which He is distinguished from all others, and by which He made Him self known to Israel, His chosen people. Accordingly Jehovah denotes specifically what God is in and to Israel; Elohim what He is to other nations as well. That universal agency which is exercised in the world at large, and which is directed upon Israel and Gentiles alike, is by Elohim, the God of creation and providence. That special manifestation of Himself which is made to His own people is by Jehovah, the God of revelation and of redemption. The sacred writer uses one name or the other, according as he contemplates God under one or the other point of view. Where others than those of the chosen race are the speakers, as Abimelech (Gen. xxi. 22, 23) or Pharaoh (xli. 38, 39), it is natural that they should say Elohim, unless they specifically refer to the God of the patriarchs (xxvi. 28) or of Israel (Ex. v. 2), when they will say Jehovah. In transactions between Abraham or his descendants and those of another race God may be spoken of under aspects common to them both, and the name Elohim be employed; or he may be regarded under aspects specifically Israelitish, and the name Jehovah be used. Again, as Elohim is the generic name for God as distinguished from

*In the Homiletic Review (published by Funk & Wagnalls Company, London and New York) for August, 1898, pp. 166ff., and for September, pp. 257ff., Dr. Green has two valuable papers on "Elohim and Jehovah in the Pentateuch." He first examines the use of these divine names in other books of the Old Testament, and then considers their use in the books of Moses. These papers are the latest and, we think, the most careful and complete connected discussion of the subject that has proceeded from Dr. Green's pen. They deserve the study of those who would master this important question. At the close of his investigation he makes the claim, which is not too strong: The divine names occurring in the Pentateuch have now been considered in detail, and I think it may fairly be said that it has been shown that their employment is regulated by the same principles which prevail in the rest of the Old Testament."

beings of a different grade, it is the term proper to be used when God and man, the divine and the human, are contrasted, as [Gen. xxx. 2; xxxii. 28; xlv. 5, 7, 8; l. 19, 20" (Higher Criticism, pp. 102, 103).

Dr. Green further observes that "while in certain cases one of the divine names is manifestly appropriate to the exclusion of the other, there are others in which either name might properly be used, and it is at the discretion of the writer which he will employ. When an event is capable of being viewed under a double aspect, either as belonging to the general scheme of God's universal providence, or as embraced within the administration of His plan of grace, either Elohim or Jehovah would be in place, and it depends on the writer's conception at the time which he will employ. It is not necessary, therefore, in Genesis, any more than in other books of the Bible, to be able to show that there was a necessity for using that divine name which is actually employed. It is sufficient to show, as can invariably be done, that the writer might properly use the name which he has actually chosen "(Higher Criticism, p. 106).

It is not difficult now to answer the question of Steuernagel: "Why is the God who enters into covenant with Noah (Gen. ix) and with Abraham (Gen. xvii) called Elohim?" The covenant described in Gen. ix was made, not with the chosen seed, but with Noah and his seed, and all living creatures, with all flesh upon the earth (Gen. ix. 9, 10, 15, 17). Its universal character is made very prominent. Therefore, the general name of God, Elohim, is most appropriate. When God is set forth as distinguishing the chosen seed from the rest of mankind, then Jehovah is more fittingly used. See ver. 26 of the same chapter, where we read, "Blessed be Jehovah, God of Shem." It is surely not by accident that in the next verse the blessing of Japheth is attributed to Elohim.

But why is it Elohim who enters into covenant with Abraham (Gen. xvii)? We answer that the first verse of Gen. xvii tells us that it was Jehovah who did this; and we refuse to listen to the critics who say in the interest of their theory that this verse is an interpolation by R, or that R has at least substituted Jehovah for Elohim. It is Jehovah, then, who enters here into covenant with Abraham, or rather, renews and enlarges the covenant mentioned in Gen. xv. 18. But why is Elohim used throughout the remainder of the chapter? Because there is a peculiar significance in speaking here of God in His character as the Omnipotent Creator. El Shaddai, God Almighty, is what Jehovah calls Himself in the first verse. There was special cause to dwell on God's power. The chapter begins with mentioning the great age of Abraham. The patriarch himself is introduced as asking, "Shall a child be born unto him that is an hundred years old? And shall Sarah, that is ninety years old, bear?" (ver. 17). He was even led to suggest that the numerous posterity promised to him might be granted in the line of A son by his wife did not seem within the bounds of possibility. But he is told definitely that Sarah should bear him a son in the next year, and that she should be a mother of nations. If, to strengthen Abraham's faith, Jehovah in the beginning of the chapter thought it proper to call Himself El Shaddai, thus emphasizing His divine power, it is in admirable keeping for the sacred narrator to use subsequently throughout the theophany the familiar name of Elohim, which is a nearer equivalent of El Shaddai than Jehovah is, and is more suggestive that power belongeth unto God than this latter name.

It is further asked, "Why is the God who executes judgment on Sodom and Gomorrah called Jahweh?" The God of Abraham, Jehovah, was conspicuously revealed in the destruction of Sodom. We may answer the question in Dr. Green's own words: "It is Jehovah in chap. xviii who in condescending grace concludes the covenant transaction with Abraham by becoming his guest, and in the familiarity of friendship admits him to His counsel respecting Sodom, and accepts his intercession on its behalf; and who still further (xix. 1–28) executes the purpose which He had disclosed to Abraham, of purging his own land of gross offenders (cf. xiii. 13, xv. 16, xviii. 20, 21)" (Unity of Genesis, p. 152). What he says in the same place on the use of Elohim in xix. 29 answers well a difficulty raised by critics.

We have another question to answer: "Why is it that in perfectly parallel narratives we find at one time Jahweh and at another time Elohim (compare Gen. xii. 10-20 with xx. 1-17)?"

There is a remarkable resemblance between the two narratives. We add that there is a likeness between them which our divisive critics would obliterate. In the earlier the name Jehovah alone is used, and it occurs but once; it is the only name of God occurring in Gen. xii. 10–20. "Jehovah plagued Pharaoh and his house with great plagues because of Sarai Abram's wife" (ver. 17). In the similar narrative in Gen. xx, the name Jehovah occurs once, and that too in describing the judgment inflicted by the Lord on Abimelech, for a like offense: "For Jehovah had fast closed up all the wombs of the house of Abimelech, because of Sarah, Abraham's wife" (xx. 18). The correspondence is striking. But the à priorism of such critics as Kuenen, Wellhausen and Dillmann will not tolerate in an Elohistic chapter this verse in which the name Jehovah is found, and they accordingly ascribe it to the interference of R. But it coheres closely with the preceding sentence, which is, in fact, unintelligible without it.

We might be content with this answer to the last question. But we may draw from Hengstenberg a most satisfactory explanation of the use of Elohim throughout the rest of Gen. xx, which relates graphically the affair between Abraham and Abimelech on account of Sarah. For Abimelech God is Elohim; of Jehovah he knew nothing. Only as Elohim could God appear to him. Abraham uses in conversation with Abimelech Elohim, while he accommodates himself to his standpoint. Therefore he prays also to Elohim; for his intercession is uttered in the

ears of the king. How the use of Elohim is called forth by the contents of the chapter appears very clearly from ver. 11, where Abraham says, "Because I thought, Surely the fear of Elohim is not in this place." Abraham confesses that he was herein deceived There was in Gerar the fear of Elohim. But the fear of Jehovah did not exist there. Under no circumstances could Jehovah be used in ver. 11 (Authentie des Pentateuches, i, pp. 351, 352).

Dr. Green is censured further for maintaining that "Scripture is an organism whose parts are inspired by God and consequently combine in a harmonious whole." This is the view which the Lord Jesus Christ and His apostles held of Holy Scripture. It is the view to which those who call Christ Master are committed, and it can be vindicated against all impugners. But it is a great error to charge Dr. Green with "refusing to view the harmony of Scripture as the result of a process of development under divine guidance." We find him, in the Preface to his book which is reviewed, saying that the Pentateuch "contains the germs from which all that follows was developed." And one of his arguments to prove that Moses was the author of the Pentateuch "is furnished by the elementary character of the teachings of the Pentateuch as compared with later Scriptures in which the same truths are more fully expanded. The development of doctrine in respect to the future state, providential retribution, the spiritual character of true worship, angels and the Messiah, shows very plainly that the Pentateuch belongs to an earlier period than the book of Job, the Psalms and the Prophets' (p. 45).

As illustrative of the à priori reasoning of our critics we may instance the following statement: "Green denies, of course, that the critics believe in divine revelation at all." Such a denial, Dr. Green would make in regard to such critics as Kuenen, Reuss and Wellhausen. They were avowed antisupernaturalists. But Dr. Green never denied of such critics as Delitzsch, König, Strack, or even of Dr. C. A. Briggs, that they believed in divine revelation at all. In The Presbyterian AND REFORMED REVIEW for October, 1893, p. 553, he could thus write: "Beyond question Dr. Briggs is honestly aiming to defend the revealed Word of God and evangelical religion against the hostile attacks of a destructive and revolutionary criticism. Convinced that the critics have established much that is at variance with what has been currently believed hitherto respecting the origin and structure of the books of the Bible, he is persuaded that the only honest and safe course is frankly to accept these conclusions, and adjust the belief of the Church accordingly. He confidently maintains that nothing which is essential to the Christian faith will be lost by so doing, while, if this is not done, the Bible will be put in apparent opposition to the sure results of modern scholarship, to the serious disadvantage of the Christian faith, a disadvantage to which it cannot be rightfully subjected. This is an intelligible position." But Dr. Green proceeds to show that this position is

untenable, and that "the divorce which the professor proposes to effect is impracticable. The books of the Bible are the charter of the Christian faith. If the former are unsound, the latter cannot be maintained."

The development hypothesis to which Dr. Green is unalterably opposed is, "That the Pentateuchal codes are not, as represented in the Pentateuch itself and elsewhere in Scripture, component and mutually related parts of one complete system of legislation, but constitute so many distinct and successive systems of legislation, the next in order being in each case further developed than that which preceded it; and that the differences between the codes are such that they cannot all have belonged to any one period, least of all to the Mosaic, as represented in the Scripture account, but long periods of time must have elapsed to give occasion for their introduction." This hypothesis, which makes the whole record of the Bible on this subject a colossal forgery, he cannot accept, and he has given good and sufficient reasons for not accepting it. These reasons deserve serious and candid consideration.

Dr. Steuernagel is not well informed of Dr. Green's position, neither is he, as we have proved, as conversant as he might be expected to be with the views of the critical school to which he professes to belong. We have looked into his Commentary on Deuteronomy. He impresses us as a man very desirous of saying something novel and startling. He assails the unity of Deuteronomy. He thinks that he has discovered in the book two authors who are distinguished by him from one another by respectively applying "thou" and "you" to the people of Israel. These different authors he proposes to indicate by Sg = singular and Pl = plural. From the varying use, too, of the second and third persons he would infer a difference of source. Prof. E. König, of Rostock, has had the patience in three papers published in the Expository Times to examine minutely the arguments of this nature which Dr. Steuernagel has adduced in support of his divisive hypothesis. We venture to think that few intelligent persons who will take the trouble to read these papers will fail to be convinced that Dr. König has successfully met this attempt to divide Deuteronomy among Deuteronomistic documents Sg and Pl, in addition to J, E, P and Redactors. Sure we are that the new criteria could be easily applied to impugn the unity of other books of the Bible and of extracanonical writings, and even of unquestionable productions of nineteenth-century authors

We may be permitted to subjoin a single specimen of the liberty Dr. Steuernagel allows himself in Scriptural exegesis. He has these brief notes on Deut. xviii. 15: "The Lord thy God will raise up unto thee a prophet from the midst of thee, of thy brethren, like unto me; unto him ye shall hearken." Like unto me. "Like unto me." is remarkable, as Moses elsewhere in the Law does not speak thus of his own person, and it may therefore well be regarded as a sign that this passage has proceeded from a Redactor." אליו תשמעון "An addition on account of the plural number, especially as without it the connec-

tion of ver. 16 is improved." Such arbitrary criticism aims at the destruction of the Christian argument from Messianic prophecy in the Old Testament. It may be called critical exegesis, but it is really no better than the working of reckless caprice. It seems to Steuernagel a small matter to erase from the Bible the brief words, "Like unto me," "Unto him ye shall hearken," to say of them lightly that they are additions by an unknown reviser to a document which Moses never wrote, but which originated long centuries after his death. But precious in the sight of the LORD is that Word which he has once spoken, though it may be rejected by professed interpreters of the Bible. This Word of the LORD "is settled in heaven" (Ps. exix, 89). And it is not forgotten by Him. Was not this apparent when the disciples who were with Jesus on the Mount of Transfiguration with Moses and Elijah heard a voice from heaven, saying, "Hear him?" Even unbelieving commentators cannot avoid admitting that this voice from heaven "Him hear!" (the "Him" has the emphasis) points significantly back to the command in Deut. xviii. 15, "Unto him ye shall hearken." Christ, too, had assuredly in His mind the words, "a prophet like unto me," when He said to the Jews: "If ye believed Moses, ye would believe me; for he wrote of me" (John v. 46). And Peter preached to the Jews after Christ's resurrection that in the person of Jesus the prophet, like unto Moses, had been raised up, unto whom they should hearken. Men who intelligently believe Christ and His apostles cannot avoid believing that the Law was given by Moses, and that it was divinely revealed to him. He who said to the scribes who evaded that Law, who explained away its obvious meaning, "Ye have made void the Word of God because of your tradition" (Matt. xv. 6), would be less severe now in condemning those who have no more reverence for that Law than for some old profane documents that have been preserved to our time? May we not think of the Lord Jesus as now saving to a perverse and unbelieving generation of destructive critics of the Scriptures: Woe unto you, critics, ye have made void the Word of God by your criticisms, and by them ye are seeking to destroy other men's faith in that Word?

PITTSBURG, PA.

DUNLOP MOORE.

and again, the author rejects the idea of knowledge in favor of what he calls experience. The mystic is one who seeks the Absolute in ways other than dialectical. The modern consciousness has an intense feeling of freedom; this freedom is, at bottom, nothing else than disinterestedness, and, being such, it is essentially homogeneous with the Absolute. This disinterestedness is an alienation of the self, "a voluntary abdication of the me." In this way does the mystic overtake the Unknowable--it is still the Unknowable, to be sure, but it is experienced. Thus Mysticism lends itself to the postulates of Agnosticism, "but it refuses to maintain an attitude of religious respect to the Unknowable merely as Unknowable." Indeed, the mystic soul does not experience the Absolute immediately, but only by means of symbols. The mystic walks not by faith or by sight, but by symbols. Augustine could reach the very limits of intellection, but his purely metaphysical genius was ill adapted to the use of symbols and so we hear him exclaim: "I got as far as the thinking force, which is myself. I had a flashing gleam of you, O my God, and then immediately sinking backwards I said, 'Who can go further? Shall I seek visions? Many have tried them and have found only illusions,"

The perception of the transcendental is the first step in the mystic experience. Ribot is quoted with sanction: "Clear consciousness is but a small part of total consciousness." We need the abandon of the mystic, "the faculty of valor;" we need the naïve consciousness of the savage in some degree; we need to understand better Pascal's meaning when he says, "The heart feels first principles;" we need the recognition of what the author calls the "excessivity" of truth; we must remember that the foundations of things rebel against rigid formulæ, and that the way to be sure not to know the greatest truths is to be very eager or to try very hard to know them.

These symbols are the sole instruments of the mystic consciousness. Here we are led to the verge of the Swedenborgian doctrine of knowledge. All mental activity is by means of symbols. Science lives by symbols; "we employ anthropomorphic substitutes" for the purely mathematical or scientific terms which ought to be used. A fortiori, the use of symbols in philosophy is indispensable. The εἴδωλα of Democritus is closely akin to the symbolism of religion. Symbols give to consciousness both stable equilibrium and its quota of representations. They give vivacity, fixity, consistency to religious thought. When St. Bonaventure borrowed a symbol from mathematics and applied it to the Eternal, he gave vividness to our conception of the Divine: Deus est sphaera intelligibilis, cujus centrum est ubique et circumferentia nusquam. Symbols, however, do not represent so much as Scripture is largely the analytical translation of symbols. If Isaiah had been cogitating dialectically, we should have had a page of philosophy on the nature of holiness instead of the vision in the sixth chapter of his prophecies. The Trinity is a mystic notion, a psychological symbol, for the human mind could not have conceived it dialectically. Bossuet is here quoted: "A created Trinity which God effects in our souls represents to us the Increate Trinity."

This theory of knowledge is very far-reaching. It is one thing to say that all objective knowledge is analogical, and quite another that all knowledge is symbolical. Spencer says we cannot know the *Ding an sich*. Récéjac agrees with this, only he says we can experience not the Ding, but symbols of it; or, more accurately, he says we experience the Ding by means of the symbols. But what of the relation between the symbols and the *Ding an sich*? The generous cloak of the mystic covers this gap and he rests content. The author argues strenuously for the exclusive subjectivity of all

VII.

REVIEWS OF

RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

L-APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY.

ESSAY ON THE BASES OF THE MYSTIC KNOWLEDGE. By E. RÉCÉJAC, Doctor of Letters. Translated by SARA CARR UPTON. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1899. 8vo, pp. xi, 287.

This book will have a warm welcome from those who desire some sound, clear and able statement of the distinguishing idea of enlightened modern Mysticism. We may overlook the paradox when we see the publishers' announcement of it as "a scientific exposition of Mysticism." The paradox is in the fact that Mysticism is in essential antithesis to science; accordingly, to formulate scientifically the principles of Mysticism would be, ipso facto, to destroy them. However, the book is exceptionally clear in its thought, vigorous in its style, and often brilliant in its striking insight and expression.

The philosophical basis of the argument is partly Hegelian, partly Kantian. It reminds one of Bradley's Appearance and Reality in its search for the Absolute, and of Spencer's First Principles in its giving up of that search. It is, for the most part, a study in epistemology, and is worth noticing, among the many such, only because it proposes its unique answer to the problem. It posits the inability of the human knowing faculty to compass the Absolute. "The work of knowing—the effort to synthetize the world and the ego—is forever recommencing" (p. 2). Of course, then, that effort can never advance to a successful accomplishment. Metaphysics is infirm, inadequate; the Reason in man cannot define the illusions that infest the penumbra of its legitimate sphere. Bradley's cynical remark might have been quoted: "Metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct."

This assumed inability of knowledge leaves the door wide open for the mystic. By science, we *know*; by reason, we *think*; by Mysticism, we *comprehend*. Rejecting Kant's comparison of Mysticism to "some vast ocean, the empire of illusion," the author boldly declares that "either Mysticism contains a negation of thought worse than Scepticism or it is the most perfect activity of the mind" (p. 1).

We have not seen the untranslated edition of this book, but as the title is given in the English there is an inconsistency on the title-page, for, again

^{*} Appearance and Reality, p. xiv.

